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The materialist conception of history starts from theproposition that the production of the means to sup-port human life and, next to production, tfce exchange
ot things produced, is the basis of all social struc-ture; that in every society that has appeared in his-tory, the manner in which wealth is distributed and
society divided into classes or orders is dependent
upon what is produced, how it is produced, and how
the products are exchanged. From this point of view
the final causes of all social changes and political
revolutions are to be sought, not in men's brains,
not in man's better insight into external truth andjustice, but in changes in the modes of production
and exchange.
Frederick Engels
Cited in S. Hook, Marx and the Marxists
p. 160.
CHAPTER I
THEORETICAL FORMULATION
Introduction
Thomas Kuhn (1962) has put forth the notion that the his-
tory and development of science can be conceptualized through
an understanding of the emergence and dissolution of para-
digms of scientific thought. According to Kuhn, the tools,
methods, values, and theories of a science derive from the
prevailing paradigm of the time. Furthermore, he argues that
certain modes of inquiry, or certain content areas, are deemed
legitimate or illegitimate depending upon the governing para-
digm.
While Kuhn's thesis has received widespread acceptance
as a useful framework for conceptualizing the history of sci-
ence, his contention that possibly scientific knowledge it-
self is ephemeral remains a provocative challenge to the
fundamental assumption that it is the scientist's work to un-
cover actual laws of nature.
This rather blasphemous position has been developed even
more extensively by Berger and Luckmann (1966). Indeed, they
contend that all of what goes under the name of "reality",
not only science, is constructed, maintained, and transformed
over time through a dialectical social process involving the
individual and society. While Kuhn recognizes the importance
of the sociology of the scientific community in influencing
2the persistence or abandonment of a paradigm, his analysis
stops short of directly implicating social factors as deter-
minants of changes in paradigms. Instead, while he sees so-
cial factors as important, his primary attribution in the mo-
dification of a paradigm lies in the serrendipitous discovery
of "anomalies", that is, "actual" findings which undermine
the credibility of the existing paradigm.
Whether in science or in the social universe, two notions
emerge from Kuhn and Berger and Luckmann. First of all, both
works posit the idea that at any given time in history, there
are models, themes, or paradigms upon which scientific and
social reality are founded. These "constellations of beliefs"
(Kuhn, p. 174) or "disciplinary matrices" (Kuhn, p. 182) de-
termine which areas of inquiry are to receive attention and
which are to be ignored. In addition, the way attention is
directed, and the very interpretations made, derive from the
underlying assumptions which comprise the paradigm.
Second, both works make attributions regarding transfor-
mations of either paradigm or social reality. As noted
above, Kuhn attributes changes in paradigm to real scientific
discovery of anomolies, while Berger and Luckmann attribute
change to an ongoing dialectical relation in which societal
members continually confirm and transform each other and the
society through their confirmations.
These differences in attribution between Kuhn and Berger
and Luckmann point only to a difference in values. Kuhn
will
3not go so .far as to deny "reality." Berger and Luckmann, on
the other hand, will not locate the dialectical process they
elucidate in a material context. For purposes of comparison,
it should be noted that a Marxist position would understand
the dialectical relations between underlying social or scien-
tific paradigms, their ob j ectification and reification as
"reality", and their continual transformation over time, in
a context which situates this entire process in an economic
system which reproduces and transforms itself in concert with
the development of capitalism. Assuming this position, one
could argue that a prevailing paradigm, and the socially con-
structed reality that is associated with it, are themselves
to be understood as reflections of an economic moment in his-
tory. A notable change in paradigm, then, can potentially be
related to economic developments. Or, the kind of transfor-
mations Berger and Luckmann describe can be viewed as medi-
ated by or located in an advancing capitalist society.
In arriving at this point, we have made a number of as-
sumptions which need clarification. First, we have assumed
the plausibility of Kuhn's argument that in a science, there
exist belief systems, or disciplinary matrices, or paradigms,
which govern the work in the field and which are transformed
as anomalies present themselves. Second, we have further as-
sumed Berger and Luckmann' s assertion that on a more general
societal level, reality is essentially a social construction
emanating from an ongoing, historical interactional process.
4Third, if we now assume a Marxist viewpoint, we find that
there is no essential difference between scientific paradigms
and socially constructed realities, in that both are them-
selves situated in and reflections of a capitalist economic
system in which all elements of the society serve in the sys-
tem's reproduction.
One science which is precariously situated at the inter-
face of scientific and social reality is psychology. In
fact, it is the job of psychology to "scientifically" con-
struct, measure, and describe social reality. This task be-
comes even more confounded if we keep in mind the assumption
that scientific constructions are themselves socially and
perhaps economically determined. From this position, psy -
chology serves to scientifically reify social reality , in
that it makes of behavior concretized scientific laws , which
are then enacted by individuals.
Given this, were it possible to articulate the "paradigm"
in which psychology currently operates, we could then perhaps
specify the dimensions on which it constructs and interprets
people and their behavior. Rather than accept the findings
of psychology as fact, then, we would attempt to uncover
the
paradigm or disciplinary matrix upon which these "facts" and
"findings" are founded. If we could then relate the dimen-
sions of that paradigm to the present social and
economic
5system, it. might become possible to see how the field perpet-
uates and reproduces that structure.
Undoubtably, this is seemingly a preposterous task.
First of all, it is difficult, if not impossible, to ascer-
tain an essentially hypothetical set of beliefs which con-
stitute a paradigm. There exists no obvious methodology for
such an endeavor. Second, any obtainable methodology would
itself be subject to contamination by its own existence with-
in the paradigm. Indeed, it would be easier to approach this
task with the clarity and the distance which an historical
perspective affords. Clearly, it becomes impossible to at-
tempt such an effort without acknowledging one's own partici-
pation in the subject matter itself, i.e., the paradigm. In
admitting this source of "bias", however, we only reflect the
paradox of the reality of our involvement in the ongoing con-
struction of our world.
Given all the above caveats , we will attempt, if just
for the sake of exploration, to elicit the paradigm of the
science whose job it is to scientifically explicate our so-
cially constructed reality. We also undertake this task be-
cause it is preferable to tacitly supporting the social and
economic structure by generating more "scientific psycholo-
gical data." Hence we are forced to look at this science,
rather than to look through it.
At the outset of such an exploration, it should be noted
that our overriding assumption suggests that if we can
elicit
6information contributing to a discernible paradigm, we will
find it to be representative and confirming of the conditions
of a highly advanced, technological capitalist system. We
expect to find a paradigm consonant with these conditions be-
cause we have assumed the premise of psychology's participa-
tion in and elaboration of a seemingly objective reality
which is continually socially constructed. Such conditions
would be reflected in a paradigm which concerns itself with
method and technique , rather than substantive content and
process
.
Kelly' s Theory of Personal Constructs and the Rep Test
Fortunately, there exists both a theory and a related
methodology in psychology which provides the psychological
analog to the social construction or paradigmatic construc-
tion of reality. Such an approach comes out of George Kelly's
theory of personal constructs (1955)
.
At the outset, Kelly views the individual as a scientist
who, through personal experimentation, constructs dimensions
on which his personal and interpersonal world is anticipated
and interpreted. Kelly argues that the individual's primary
goal as a scientist is to predict and control events. In or-
der to do this, the individual represents his world through
patterns or templates (constructs) which differentiate and
give meaning to his relationships. These constructs are
in-
tegrated more comprehensively into what Kelly calls the
indi-
7vidual's "construct system". These construct systems, then,
are composed of an array of potentially integrated dimensions
on which the individual organizes and understands events.
Kelly notes that some constructs are widely shared
across people, while others are more private and idiosyncrat-
ic. Furthermore, he says that constructs and construct sys-
tems can be modified as certain dimensions lose their sali-
ency and are superceded by other, perhaps more highly articu-
lated dimensions
. These changes can accrue from a psycho-
therapeutic process in which the individual is encouraged to
expand or refine his construct system.
In order to assess the nature and quality of an indivi-
dual's construct system, it becomes important to have some
clinical tool which will elucidate for both client and thera-
pist the dimensions which comprise that system. While the
client
a
himself would have difficulty reporting the constructs
he uses, and while it would be inaccurate for the therapist
to infer another's constructs, Kelly has provided a method
for the elicitation of an individual's constructs.
Kelly's Role Construct Repertory Test, or Rep test (Kel-
ly, 1955), has the individual use significant people in his
life as stimulus items in order to elicit bi-polar dimensions
(constructs) which illustrate the similarity of two of these
people and their distinction from a third. In its clinical
usage, the interviewer typically asks the client to name be-
tween 15 and 24 significant others who are representative of
8various elements of the individual's experience, both past
and present. Next, a series of "sorts", or sets of three
stimulus items, is presented. The client responds with rele-
vant dimensions which distinguish two of the three from the
third. The constructs obtained from these sorts (usually 15
to 22 sorts) then provide the clinician with a large number
of dimensions for deciphering how the client perceives and
acts on his world.
Given these data, the clinician looks for qualities
other than content which affect the nature of the construct
system. For instance, one of the most salient factors dif-
ferentiating construct systems is their degree of cognitive
complexity. Several investigators have attempted to elabor-
ate on the meaning and implications of cognitive complexity.
Bieri e_t aJL. (1966) have argued that cognitive complexity en-
tails both differentiation (the number of dimensions) and
articulation (the extent of discriminations made within a
dimension). Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder (1961) note a con-
crete-abstract dimension as a significant aspect of cognitive
complexity. The notion of cognitive complexity as a person-
ality variable and its importance in determining behavior
have generated numerous studies (cf. Bonarius, in Maher
,
1965).
Aside from cognitive complexity as a quality of con-
struct systems, subsequent research has isolated a host of
other factors. For instance, a construct is considered "con-
9stellatory'.' if it fixes the other possible realm membership,
as in stereotyping. Or, a construct is called Mpreemptive M
if it restricts its elements exclusively to its own domain
(Wiggins, 1973). Hinkle (1965), through the use of his Im-
plications Grid (a variant of the Rep grid), has extensively
researched the connections between and among constructs and
other dimensions which may be implied. Understanding these
factors helps the clinician or researcher to better predict
how an individual is processing and acting on his experience.
According to Kelly, then, it is possible to generate
from the Rep test data a hierarchically ordered construct
system in which subordinate dimensions are subsumed under
superordinate ones. Having organized the data in this way,
one can then assess aspects of total systems. For example,
one can consider the permeability or impermeability, or the
tightness or looseness of a system, thereby gaining still
more information on the individual's coding of experience.
These factors are of importance in determining the likelihood
of change and in deciding what factors are malleable and
which are not. Consonant with this focus of change, Kelly
also notes that each bipolar construct contains an emergent
and a submerged pole, that is, a pole that is evident in the
person's behavior, and a pole which is not ostensibly repre-
sented in the person's repetoire. The submerged pole is seen
as indicative of the individual's potential for different ac-
tion as behavior changes.
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The original Rep test itself is too rudimentary to get
all the information needed to figure out the relative posi-
tions of certain constructs to other constructs. According-
ly, a lot is left to the clinician's interpretation. Never-
theless, a host of variations and expansions on the original
test have been made over time. For instance, in order to
find the relative importance of different constructs, the in-
dividual is asked to check off on a grid form of the test all
of the 22 people for whom the emergent pole of each construct
is relevant. In this way, one can more accurately infer the
"range of convenience", or the applicability, of each con-
struct. Further, Kelly has provided a non-parametric factor
analysis in order to more objectively determine the hierarchy
of the construct system for each individual.
Clearly, this methodology has a wide range of applica-
bility both in clinical assessment and in personality re-
search. It is a particularly elegant technique in its abil-
ity to provide a rather objective but still phenomenological
,
idiographic measure. It is a method which allows for both
qualitative interpretation and quantitative analysis. Fur-
thermore, both the stimulus items and the constructs are gen-
erated by the individual, thereby reducing the type of bias
inherent in rating forms, and increasing the likelihood of
richer and more personal information. In general terms, the
Rep test has far-reaching potential for a variety of differ-
ent interests. Indeed, all that needs to be altered is the
11
nature of the stimulus items for which one gives dimensions
(cf. Bannister and Mair, 1968).
One example illustrating the wide range of potential use
is Kelly's Situational Resources Rep Test. In this varia-
tion, Kelly uses as stimulus items a representative array of
stressful situations. The subject is asked to think of a
specific instance in his life which fits the situational
category. Written in on a grid form, each situation fills
one row on the grid. The columns are composed of the names
of a number of significant people in the subject's life. The
subject is then asked to indicate to whom he feels he could
have gone for help or support. What emerges from each sub-
ject's grid is what Kelly calls a "distribution of depend-
encies" (1955) . While this grid form yields information
about environmental supports rather than constructs per se ,
it suggests the flexibility the basic methodology has for
research endeavors
.
From Kelly to Kuhn
For our purposes we want to amend the Rep test in order
to elicit the paradigm of psychology. In order to do this,
let us first review the theory of personal constructs in
light of our task. While Kelly's theory implies a psycholo-
gical construction of individual reality, we have noted ear-
lier our interest in uncovering the dimensions of a socially
and/or scientifically constructed reality. Kelly gives us a
12
method for .figuring out how the individual makes and uses his
constructs. Thus far in the sociology of knowledge and in
the philosophy of science, most of the methods available have
be en historical hindsight and armchair speculation.
Kelly's work is applicable to the problem of psychology's
paradigm if we assume the following analogy, that is: that a
construct system is to the individual
, as a paradigm is to
the field
. While no one has heretofore developed a method-
ology which concretizes this analogy, the connections between
construct system and paradigms, and between Kelly and Kuhn,
have been made (Holland, and Leman, in Bannister, 1970).
Also, the view of man as a scientist, a notion central to
Kelly's theory, has been seen as potentially useful in study-
ing the field of psychology and in assessing its legitimacy
and sophistication as a science.
Shotter (in Bannister, 1970) has made a number of these
linkages between Kelly and Kuhn. First, because Kelly views
man as a scientist, he makes numerous references to the na-
ture of science itself. According to Shotter, "One can find
all but identical views to Kelly's in Kuhn (1962), where he
has documented the changing paradigm in the natural sciences,
arguing that they were all 'scientific' in their own terms"
(p. 223 in Bannister, 1970). In other words, one can apply
Kuhn's stage description of the finding of anomalies, the
subsequent "revolution" that occurs, and the resulting change
in world view, to the growth and change of an individual's
13
construct system in psychotherapy or in a psychotic break
(James, 1975).
Indeed, Shotter notes that Kelly's commentary on science
itself is similar to Kuhn's, in that both realize that sci-
ence does not provide "real" descriptions of "reality" but
rather offers schemes for the ordering of experience. These
"schemata" make up either the construct system of the indi-
vidual or the paradigm of the science, depending on the unit
of analysis. Kelly's model of man is that of man with a
model- -Kuhn' s model of science is that of scientists with a
paradigm. Both are representations or constructions of re-
ality, one being personal and individual, the other imper-
sonal and collective.
Although these connections are fairly obvious, no one
has ever extended Kelly's Rep test methodology to look at
paradigms. In addition, while the self - reflexivity of Kel-
ly's notion of man as scientist invites one to evaluate the
construct system of a science itself (Kelly, 1966, in Bannis-
ter, 1970), this work has only been done in an unsystematic
and cursory fashion. Bannister (1970), for instance, has
proposed a definitional requirement of a science in terms of
construct theory and has tried to assess how "scientific"
psychology is in these terms. However, while Bannister has
tried to apply construct theory to science, he has sought
only to determine whether or not psychology is a science.
His analysis suggests that because psychology is composed of
14
so many tiny and unorganized pieces of data, we are currently
faced with numerous "psychologies" (cf. Kuhn's preparadig-
matic phase)
,
rather than a unified system of thought and re-
search. Although we will return later to Bannister's cri-
tique of the state of the field, it should be noted that he
too has stopped short of trying to elicit, in a Kellian way,
the construct system or paradigm of the field.
Given the novelty of the present modification of Kelly,
the proposed research, described below, is designed to be an
initial exploration, both of systematically investigating
psychology's paradigm, and in extending Kelly's methodology
to look at a system of thought that exists across people, ra-
ther than within one person. In the section which follows,
a methodology for such purposes is, described.
15
CHAPTER II
METHODOLOGY
A Revised Rep Test for a Paradigm
The first step in modifying the Rep test for our pur-
poses was to change the stimulus items. The list of repre-
sentative significant others used in the typical test would
be useful if we wanted "subjects", or respondents, to give
constructs for important people in their lives. Kelly uses a
list of other people
,
because it is experience and interac-
tion with people that makes up an individual's view of his
psychosocial world. In this case, we wanted our psychologist-
subjects to generate a list of representative concepts , for
it is concepts which make up the psychologist's work in the
field as well as his "psychological- scientific view" of
things. By "concept" we mean any abstraction or representa-
tion of something, or phenomenon, ranging from representing
something fairly operational to highly theoretical, which in-
forms the psychologist's work. Indeed, it is the job of the
psychologist to create and interact with concepts , which pre-
sumably grow out of the paradigm of the field. Hence, the
major modification in our paradigm Rep test was the use of
"concepts" in place of people.
Parallel to Kelly's administration of the Rep test, our
psychologist-subjects were asked to generate a list of repre-
sentative concepts. What was meant by representative? In
16
Kelly's Rep test, a representative list of people includes
people from different periods in the individual's life
(school teacher, first girl/boyfriend), people in different
status and role positions to the individual (boss, father,
spouse, friend), different idealized types (most intelligent,
most ethical), and different emotional feelings and attitudes
(like, dislike, respect, trust).
For our purposes, a partially analogous array of repre-
sentative concepts (see p. 92-93, list of concepts) included:
1) concepts from different periods in psychology's develop-
ment (concepts 7, 8, 9, 10); 2) concepts which have varying
weight in influencing the field (ephemeral/fad versus last-
ing) ; 3) concepts with utility for psychologists in their
work tasks (concepts 1, 3, 13, 14); 4) concepts that have in-
fluenced the personal development of psychologists (concepts
2, 4, 15); 5) some currently used concepts with different
saliences (concepts 5, 6); and 6) molar concepts which tap
into theoretical orientations (concepts 11, 12). All of
these concepts also tapped into degrees of preference for the
subjects. In summary, then, the concept list used in this
study asked for concepts with different historical value to
the field and to the individual psychologist, different util-
ity in various parts of the psychologist's work, and differ-
ent personal priorities and valences to the individual.
After a list of concepts was obtained from a subject,
s/he was then asked to think of bipolar constructs for fif-
17
teen sorts (triads) from the original list of fifteen con-
cepts (see pp. 95-96). in compiling the sorts to be used in
this part, an attempt to provide some rationale was made.
Three factors went into this rationale: 1) an attempt was
made not to repeat any pairs within the triads--this eventu-
ally led to some arbitrariness; 2) an attempt was made not to
put together triads in which the split between two similar
items and one different item was overly obvious (e.g., like
and dislike)
.
This was done so that the constructs obtained
would not, as far as possible, be tautological, or repeti-
tious of the concepts, themselves. Indeed, what we wanted
was for the subject to work at generating dimensions underly-
ing the concepts, for in so doing, we could tap into the di-
mensions upon which we construct the field. While the diffi-
culty of this rather abstract task was acknowledged, some
initial piloting suggested that it was possible.
Third, some of the sorts had a specific rationale. For
instance, sort I put together three concepts at different
time periods in the field. Sort II put together personal-
historical factors. Sort III compiled three tasks in the
psychologist's work. Sort XIII tapped into "influence" in
personal life, in working with others, and in the field it-
self. Many of the sorts contained concepts which could be
seen to pull for varying relationships between the field and
the individual, between different parts of the field, and be-
tween different time periods in the field.
18
A few issues seemed problematic at this point. First,
each subject would have his own list from which he would pro-
vide dimensions. How could we then compile data across sub-
jects? The rationale behind consolidating the data across
subjects derived from our expectation that there would be
similar dimensions underlying the concepts used in the field.
(If there were not, and if it were then impossible to compile
data across subjects, that, in itself, would be an interest-
ing finding.) Furthermore, in order to elicit the constructs
that comprise that paradigm, we wanted to use concepts that
were relevant to our subjects. Were we to provide a particu-
lar list of concepts, we would have run the risk of subjects'
unfamiliar ity with the terms. Second, what if one subject's
concept for, say, a useful research concept, had been at odds
with, or theoretically opposite to, another subject's useful
research concept? Again, since we assumed that related di-
mensions underlie all concepts, we could have possibly found
that even the identical construct emerged from seemingly op-
positional concepts.
Aside from translating the original Rep test into the
form described above, we also modified the Rep grid used by
Kelly in order to get further information on each subject
(and later across Ss) on the range of convenience of the con-
structs obtained. In Kelly's grid, the constructs the indi-
vidual provides are written on the right side of a grid
chart, and the emergent and submerged poles of each construct
19
are indicated. In this format, the rows are made up of con-
structs and the columns contain the stimulus items. In Kel-
ly's test, those items are people.
mother father sibling
teacher
boss
friend
spouse
Constructs
emergent-
- submergent
Sort I 1. 2,4 + + 0 * good bad
Sort II fat i thin
i
The sub j ect is asked to put an + in the boxes which in-
dicate the two of the three stimulus items which make up the
emergent pole of the construct, and an o in the box which in-
dicates the stimulus item in the sort which make up the sub-
merged pole. Then, the subject is asked to place a star (*)
in all the other boxes (representing stimulus items to whom
the emergent pole also applies). This determines the range
of convenience of the construct. Note that in the example
given above, sort I consisted of stimulus items 1, 2, and 4
or mother, father, and teacher. Mother and father were seen
as good and teacher as bad. In determining the range of con-
venience of this construct, we find that it is applicable to
20
two other people [friend, spouse).
This grid form was used in the present study, but sub-
jects wrote down their concepts in place of people. In simi-
lar fashion to Kelly, Ss put stars where the emergent pole
they generated was relevant. (See grid form of booklet, p.
97) .
Evaluation of This Approach and Methodology
Although Kelly (1966, in Bannister, 1970) and Bannister
(1970) see construct theory as a potential tool for evaluat-
ing psychology as a science and as a system of thought, the
theory and method has not been concretized into anything like
the approach outlined above. While the extension of Kelly's
theory and method was an experiment in itself, it only repre-
sented one way of getting at the paradigm in psychology. An-
other approach to this problem is presented in order to as-
sess the advantages and disadvantages of the present study.
In an extensive effort to uncover basic trends in psy-
chological theory both over time and at any given point in
time, Coan (1968) undertook a quantitative, multivariate de-
sign in which 54 psychological theorists on 34 variables co-
vered important variables of psychological theory. The 54
theorists had been drawn from an original list of 142 theo-
rists and had been selected from earlier research which de-
termined the rated importance of their contributions to psy-
chological theory (Coan $ Zagona, 1962). The 34 variables
21
were derived from four general categories said by Coan to
comprise psychological theory: content emphasis (topic),
methodological emphasis, basic assumptions, and mode of con-
ceptualization. Subjects rated the applicability of these 34
variables to 54 theorists on a scale from -2 to +2. Factor
analytic work done on a basic score matrix of 54 X 34 yielded
six factors:
1) subj ectivistic vs. ob j ectivistic
2) holistic vs. elementar istic
3) transpersonal vs. personal
4) quantitative vs. qualitative
5) dynamic vs. static
6) endogenist vs. exogenist
These six factors were intercorrelated and an analysis of
their correlations yielded two factors at a second stratum.
These two higher order dimensions were: synthetic vs. analy -
tic and functional vs . restrictive . Beyond that, Coan posits
a relationship between the division of theorists along this
dimension and the temperament of the theorist. The dimen-
sions of psychological theory he constructs are reported be-
low:
endogenism dynamic personal qualitative holism subjectiv-
ism
FLUID
Functional Synthetic
22
RESTRICTIVE
Analytic Structural
objectivism elemental quan- transpersonal static""exo-
titative ' genism
Coan also notes historical trends from 1880-1960. His
findings indicate an increasing shift from subjectivist to
objectivist, from qualitative to quantitative, from endogen-
ist to exogenist. Further, he reports cyclical patterns on
the holis t-elementarist dimension which go from elementarist
to holist (in the 1920's) back to elementarist. The personal-
transpersonal dimension also changes in cycles, according to
his data.
Coan's work is clearly relevant to the present study.
His methodology is more calsified and objective, which is
both to his advantage and disadvantage. What he finds from
his data, he has gleaned from a statistical analysis of rat-
ings and hence (according to contemporary notions of what
constitutes science) , he can make his conclusions with a de-
finitiveness which the present study may lack.
Nevertheless, in light of the present study, there is
much to critique in Coan's research. First of all, he makes
no mention of the relationship of his statistical methodology
either to the historical period in which he works or to the
way it biases, modifies, and constructs the dimension he
finds. Second, he makes no connection between the historical
23
changes he finds and the social and economic developments of
those periods. It would be so easy to infer from his results
the ways in which the theories in the field mirror an increas-
ingly dehumanized, technological culture--but he eschews mak-
ing such inferences. In this way, his work has no roots and
no critical function and is reducable to mere tautology.
Third, his study is suspect in terms of the unexplained
way he picks the 34 obviously crucial variables which Ss
later apply to theorists. In fact, the very variables he
picks determine the dimensions which emerge. From an experi-
mental point of view, it is a bit presumptuous to provide
variables which supposedly make up psychological theory and
to then argue that the study has discovered or produced di-
mensions. The dimensions he reports are mere summary state-
ments of the 34 variables he chooses.
Whatever the present study sacrificed in terms of "ob-
jective statistical" findings it has hopefully compensated
for with its more open-ended methodology. For in revising
Kelly's Rep test, we allowed the subject to generate both the
dimensions and the stimulus items. In this way, stimulus
items were relevant to each subject. Second, this study has
asserted an ideological position and has come out of a par-
ticular framework, rather than appearing out of nowhere and
avoiding those issues. Since those issues inhere in any in-
quiry, it is perhaps more honest to state them squarely.
Hence, if the current work is not "scientifically accurate",
24
it is at least ideologically honest.
Methodology for This Study
Having created a new test, and having provided a ration-
ale for both the stimulus items and the sorts to be used, let
us outline more specifically to whom the test was given and
the administration of the test.
The test was administered to a total of 32 respondents.
The total sample included 10 females and 22 males, with only
three women in the non-clinical groups. Subjects were all
psychologists in the "soft", "person-oriented" areas of psy-
chology: clinical, social, personality, organizational, edu-
cational. This choice was somewhat arbitrary, due to the
exploratory nature of the study, and somewhat because these
areas all deal with related aspects of people and behavior.
The 32 participants were composed of four sub-groups of eight
each- - clinical faculty; upper-level clinical graduate stu-
dents; non-clinical faculty; and non-clinical upper-level
graduate students. We chose upper- level graduate students
(third and fourth year) because the difficulty of the task
mandated a familiarity with the concepts and the field which
beginning students might not have had. While it might have
been interesting to have compared constructs from different
groups of Ss based on number of years in the field (e.g.,
faculty vs. undergraduates), it was beyond the scope of this
studv to test for all level differences.
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Administrat ion
The test was administered individually to each psycholo
gist-subject. Administration consisted of eight parts:
1) A general overview of the purpose of the study was
given. Without going into the theoretical and ideological
framework from which this study emerges, the task of trying
to elicit a "paradigm" for soft psychology was explained and
discussed with subjects.
2) Kelly's construct theory and Rep test was explained
The transformations made to provide a Rep test for our pur-
poses was then discussed, and a rationale given for the use
of the stimulus items (concepts)
.
3) Each subject was asked to give fifteen different
concepts based on the list in the test. The term "concept"
was defined for Ss
.
"Concept" was used in this Rep test to
include any abstract term, or any level of abstraction, rang
ing from a specific operational term to a hypothetical term
to a global theory of behavior. Examples were not given so
as not to bias the concepts given by Ss. However, any ques-
tions raised were answered and discussed. The fifteen con-
cepts offered were written down on page 1 (list of concepts
sheet) of the booklet.
4) Each subject was then asked to supply bipolar dimen
sions which indicated a way in which two of the three con-
cepts (for each of fifteen sorts) were alike and different
from the third. In administering this part, the interviewer
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asked the subject to indicate which two concepts were being
grouped together (emergent pole) with which pole of the con-
struct. The responses were written down on page four of Ss
'
booklet (cf. booklet), which showed the sorting of the triads
and the constructs. Constructs could be repeated if desired.
5) Each subject filled in the revised grid form (page 5
of the booklet)
.
The fifteen concepts S used were written
into the columns of the grid, and the constructs (emergent
and submerged poles indicated) were written on the right mak-
ing up fifteen rows. Down the far left side, the fifteen
sorts were indicated. Ss were instructed to place a * in the
boxes under the two concepts used in the emergent pole of the
construct, and a "o" under the box of the one concept which
made up the submerged pole. This was done for all fifteen
sorts .
6) Ss were asked to place a star (*) in all other con-
cept boxes to which the fifteen emergent poles applied or
were relevant. It was explained that this was done in order
to find a range of convenience for the individual's con-
structs .
7) After the grid was completed, the task part was
over. A few personal data were noted: years in the field,
areas in psychology, sex, if S has had clinical training and
is not in clinical area, and where the individual saw him/
herself within his/her area.
8) Finally, there was time for two-way feedback. Sub-
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jects were asked to report any thoughts or feelings about do-
ing the task, and the interviewer answered any questions.
Ss' comments were noted by the interviewer for a qualitative
report about the task itself. Personal data about the sub-
ject and the subject's feedback were written on the final
sheet of the booklet.
Statement of Goals
In summarizing the investigative inquiry outlined in the
preceding pages, perhaps a formal statement of "goals" and
"expectations" is in order. We say goals and expectations
instead of "hypotheses" because of the exploratory nature of
this study. Indeed, the purpose of an "experiment" is to
try something out, to see what will result if something
novel is attempted. The present work has been an experiment
in this basic sense and has remained open-ended because of it.
One major goal of this research, however, was to begin
to elicit, in as coherent a fashion as possible, given a spe-
culative methodology, the paradigm of person-oriented or soft
psychology. Within this goal, there was one central expecta-
tion, namely, that if we found a paradigm, its dimensions
would reflect a conception and construction of people that is
in concert with an increasingly technological society in
which people are dehumanized, interchangeable, and fragment-
ed. In line with this, we anticipated a paradigm centered
around issues of method and technique rather than content.
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In more operational terms, issues of methodology would be ex-
pressed in constructs like "testable-untes table" , or "empir-
ical-hypothetical". A preponderance of constructs like these
would support the expectation noted here.
Some people might not even consider these dimensions
worthy of being called a paradigm. Indeed, in Bannister's
assessment (1970), or indictment, of psychology as a science,
he argues that the field is so fragmented that there are no
core constructs on which the field builds. Instead, the
field is only concerned with generating "numberless experi-
mental studies which are devoted to one or another type of
short term payoff and which are asking questions of such a
nature that it does not matter one iota what the experimental
answer turns out to be" (p. 54). -Finally, Bannister con-
cludes that psychology is not a science but a technology. In
critiquing the field's research, he writes, ". . .such as ap-
plied criterion of the purpose of prediction and question
asking is essentially what discriminates a technology from a
science. A technology does not need to concern itself with
the question of the elaboration of its own conceptual frame-
work, it can substitute for this requirement of a science any
immediate socioeconomic return. A reflection of this atti-
tude appears in the emphasis placed in teaching research on
techniques rather than on issues" (p. 54). It is precisely
to these issues that this research has been directed .
There were another set of expectations if some coherence
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of constructs were found. First, we expected that faculty
constructs would be more embedded in and representative of
this technologically and methodologically-based paradigm than
students'. This expectation came from Kuhn's notion that
younger members of a discipline are less socialized into and
confined by the prevailing paradigm. This expectation was
qualified, however, since the paradigm of psychology is not
removed from the larger culture but rather, as stated earli-
er, extends into and mirrors the culture's approach to peo-
ple. Hence, we might have found that younger students, while
not totally socialized into the field, may have picked up the
same constructs and values simply by being members of the
larger culture. In addition, we might have expected differ-
ences in constructs between clinicians and non-clinicians.
Again, this may have reflected Bannister's and Adams-Webber's
(1970) sense of the fragmentation of the field and the exist-
ence of what Bannister calls "psychologies" rather than an
integrated psychology.
Another central goal of this research was to explore the
feasibility of extending Kelly's Rep test for use in getting
a cognitive consensus across people. Also in this study, we
tried to see if Kelly's methodology could be usefully extend-
ed to a higher level of abstraction, that is, if subjects
could generate constructs for intangible concepts rather than
for actual people. This requires an abstract ability which
we expected psychologists to be capable of.
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Finally, we were interested in showing the extent to
which the field of psychology constructs a social reality
based on conceptions of people which reinforce and reproduce
the social and economic structure in which it occurs. It is
out of this philosophical and ideological framework that
these research questions emerged in the first place. It is
in this context that our findings have meaning.
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CHAPTER III
DATA COLLECTION AND RESULTS
Data Collection Process
This is an exploratory study, focused largely on con-
ceptual development. It required participants to develop
rather complex distinctions and judgments based on their per-
sonal frames of reference. Similarly, the collection and
analysis of these data, as will be described, entailed a
highly interpretive and interactive process
. Given this
character of the study, it becomes somewhat more important
than usual for the reader to know the process by which the
data were obtained, organized and interpreted. As a result,
the following discussion includes -some statement of my phe-
nomenological experience in collecting the data, as well as
the more public aspects of that process. Hence, the follow-
ing section describes this interactional process of adminis-
tering the Rep tests and of then deciding how to best make
sense of them.
While I closely followed the task procedures outlined
earlier, test administration turned out to be considerably
more tedious than I had anticipated. Almost immediately, I
cut down the size of my total sample from 40 to 32. Each
encounter with each participant took from one and a half to
two hours. What was most crucial for me in this process was
to figure out how each person was conceptualizing and working
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with the stimulus items, and to help them draw out their con-
structs if necessary. This was a highly abstract process for
me, in that I had to think about possible dimensions for
every sort, for each subject. This was important to do be-
cause most people found the task unusual and had trouble
thinking of bipolar dimensions which distinguished psychology
concepts
.
Each respondent was required to do two related tasks.
First s/he was to generate a list of fifteen concepts which
the person uses or sees used in the field. Even this part,
which I had expected to be relatively uncomplicated, was dif-
ficult for people. Subjects indicated that they were bother-
ed by not being able to repeat concepts. The second task,
supplying bipolar constructs which sorted sets of three con-
cepts, was even more laborious. Moving to this "meta" level
of abstraction was difficult for almost everyone. People
were not accustomed to comparing unrelated concepts in psy-
chology. Often respondents could generate only a few dimen-
sions and then just stuck with those. Others expressed a
need not to repeat constructs and instead produced a series
of constructs which were basically synonymous. Subjects who
produced more varied constructs indicated that they enjoyed
the task, found it challenging, and thought the study was in-
teresting .
Many of the faculty and a few students offered explana-
tions of their construct systems, especially when they used
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only a few constructs. For instance, one faculty said that
he was bothered by the "narrowness" of his constructs, but
that this was due to his having used behavioral concepts.
These, he said, were like "blinders" but were designed that
way for a purpose. The constructs, then, based on the re-
strictive concepts, were even narrower. Another respondent,
a student, also noted the restricted focus of concern in his
constructs. He felt that this did not reflect a narrow focus
of the field itself, but rather reflected his narrow involve-
ment in the field. To quote, "There is a narrow range of
constructs which govern my scientific behavior." In short,
relatively limited construct systems seemed troublesome to
respondents and seemed to call for explanation.
Other people commented on problems in the logic of the
task. One subject said that comparing the concepts was like
comparing "apples, oranges, and tomatoes." Another respond-
ent said that this was like comparing "apples and fruit."
Finally, a third person said that it was like comparing "ap-
ples and doorknobs." In any event, all these point to the
highly abstract nature of the task and to the unusualness of
comparing and contrasting concepts in the field. One facul-
ty, who enjoyed the task, felt that the meaning of the con-
cepts changed in the different triads and that this was in-
teresting to him. Others, who appeared to have more trouble
with the task, suggested that it was contrived because of the
forced comparisions required.
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There- were apparent relationships between subjects' be-
ing able to produce constructs relatively easily and both en-
joying the task and perceiving the constructs as accurate re-
flections of their thinking. One faculty, who felt this way,
thought the test was accurate enough that the coherence of
construct systems could predict research productivity. On
the other hand, there seemed to be a correspondence between
more limited construct systems and feelings that the test was
limiting and not reflective of respondents' thinking. One
faculty commented on the high threat level in confronting
one's own dimensions and their limitations. Most subjects,
however, seemed to attribute a paucity of constructs to the
task, the concepts, or the study itself. In sum, partici-
pants had a variety of reactions to the task. These reac-
tions seemed to be related in important ways to the kinds of
constructs they produced and to their feelings about partici-
pating in the study. To some extent, these responses influ-
enced my approach to analyzing the data.
Analy zab ility of the Data
In keeping with the variation of Kelly's Rep test em-
ployed in the study, I had anticipated being able to work
with the data in a similar fashion to the procedure Kelly
used in the original Rep test. Ideally, I thought it would
be possible to compile constructs across subjects and to then
treat these combined constructs as if they came from one con-
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glomerate protocol. Given this assumption, I expected to be
able to systematically analyze different segments of the to-
tal data. For instance, I had hoped to be able to compile
students' constructs for each of the fifteen sorts and to
then compare the conglomerate construct system to a similar
one comprised of faculty's constructs. The same thing was to
be done between the clinicians and the non- clinicians in the
sample. However, once the data were arranged in this manner,
what emerged was an unintegrated set of bipolar dimensions.
Compiled in this way, most of the contextual meaning of indi-
vidual constructs was lost. Hence, this approach to the data
was abandoned.
Another plan I had envisioned was to look at all 480
constructs together. The total number was to be cut down, as
there would be repetitions of constructs. However, what be-
came clear in looking at the data in this way was that the
same dimension had a different shade of meaning and played a
different role within its own context, that is, in the con-
struct system whence it came. Hence, while it was possible
to glean valuable information on the types of constructs,
from looking at the total sample, this did not help in the
construction of a consensual construct system, or paradigm.
A third plan was to look at differences in the kinds of
dimensions between " sorts . " With some intentionality , sorts
had been arranged to tap into various differences in the
field. For instance, I was interested in the kinds of con-
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structs generated from a comparison of concepts which used to
be popular in the field to those currently popular. In addi-
tion, I was interested in comparisons between research versus
applied concepts. However, the dimensions obtained seemed
independent of the sort in which they were generated. When
the data were ordered in this way, little emerged as suggest-
ive of a way to intelligently proceed in comparing constructs
from different sorts. To some extent, the sorts were arbi-
trary, and evidently this was reflected in the constructs.
While I had also hoped that a comparison of concepts for each
of the fifteen concepts titles would prove interesting, this
too provided little fruitful direction for the analysis.
Another important approach to the data which I had
thought would be illuminating was also abandoned. This en-
tailed compiling data, across subjects, based on the "range
of convenience" grids filled out by each respondent. As
noted earlier, the last part of the actual task for each per-
son involved checking other concepts in his/her list to which
the emergent pole of each dimension could be applied. Ac-
cording to Kelly, this is important in determining how wide-
ly applicable a construct is in a person's thinking. Thus,
this was seen to be a. good way of prioritizing and hierarch-
ically ordering constructs in the overall sample.
However, there were several reasons why this did not
seem productive once the data were in. First, respondents
were both impatient and tired by the time they were asked to
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fill out the Rep grid. Because of this, my impression was
that the grids were done hastily and were probably not re-
flective of a careful assessment of a dimension's applica-
bility for a subject. Second, since many constructs were
repeated (or synonymous constructs used) , it appeared that
the salience of a construct could be determined simply by the
frequency with which it was used. In fact, in looking at the
Rep grids, constructs used only once seemed to have a very
limited range of convenience, while constructs used a lot
appeared to have wide ranges of convenience. Third, it was
not possible to compile a master range of convenience grid
across subjects, because the reliability and validity of this
notion was ambiguous enough within each protocol, and because
the same dimensions had different "meanings only within proto-
cols and not between them. Given these judgments, it did not
make sense, nor bring the data closer to a consensual con-
struct system, to pursue this course of action.
In experimenting with all the various breakdowns and re-
arrangements of the data, it seemed that each construct sys-
tem itself was a total Gestalt or unit and needed to be con-
sidered in that way. In attempting to go beyond an under-
standing of an individual's thinking, then, it would still be
necessary to build from an idiographic base. Therefore, it
was from such an individualistic perspective that the data
were interpreted. Other possibilities undoubtably existed,
but this approach seemed to be an appropriate and potentially
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fruitful one. Since the approach selected is highly inter-
pretive, a detailed explanation of the procedures adopted in
making sense of the data is presented below.
Data Explication
: Criteria
Perhaps the most informative way of working with and
analyzing the data has stemmed from an individualistic, al-
most clinical approach to each of the 32 construct systems.
This understanding of the data is similar to Kelly's original
procedures of how to use Rep tests. In this case, however,
the constructs are certainly different than what Kelly would
have collected, in that they are substantially more abstract
and do not have any tangible referents, as do constructs de-
rived from "role titles." Hence, in making interpretations
and drawing conclusions, it behooves us to closely examine
the kind of data obtained. An explication of this interpret-
ive process necessitates both close scrutiny of individual
construct systems and continual comparison to other Rep
tests. This process of comparing and contrasting the produc-
tions of different subjects is crucial, for it has been out
of this close interaction with the data that common and sig-
nificant themes have emerged. The inferential process en-
tails pulling apart and then integrating each individual's
system as well as comparing two or more systems of thought.
I carried out this analysis with the help of my commit-
tee chairperson. Because of the abstract and interactive
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nature of the task, it appeared important for someone besides
me to stay close to the data to provide comparative judgments
In analyzing the data, it felt like one either had to be al-
most literally on top of or in the midst of the data, or a
good distance away from them. For these reasons, all commit-
tee members had an opportunity to look at and "interact"
with the data.
This task was difficult for other reasons as well. It
appears that it is nearly impossible to hold more than just
a few "thought systems" in one's mind simultaneously. This
is a very important point in understanding the data and the
types of conclusions drawn from them. It is also a serious
limitation in this study and possibly in the Rep test itself.
Perhaps this is at least a partial
-explanation of why Kelly's
test remains most valuable as an idiographic instrument. In-
deed, Wiggins (1973) points out that "the nature of personal
construct theory and the procedures of the Rep test make it
clear that Kelly considered this assessment approach to be of
value in the assessment of individuals, considered one at a
time " (p. 494) (underlining mine). Wiggins' point suggests
the difficulty one has in holding in mind and juggling more
than even one construct system. Nevertheless, the signific-
ance of various nuances within one system can only be assess-
ed in relation to others and thus, this is a valuable way to
proceed.
Hence, while we acknowledge certain problems in making
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sweeping statements from groups of construct systems, simply
because this is so difficult to do, it is still elucidating
to proceed with a close, detailed examination of several of
the individual protocols. This is crucial to do, in that
this may be the only way to allow the reader to know and
evaluate the process by which interpretations and conclusions
were reached. Therefore, what follows below is a dissection
of some of the data and of my interactive process with it.
The kinds of questions to keep in mind in guiding the expose
focus on the following kinds of issues: how is the individual
respondent thinking as a psychologist? What are the salient
dimensions which inform his/her thinking? What implications
do these dimensions have for how the individual will view, or
ignore, important phenomena potentially available to him/her
as a psychologist? How is this person's way of construing
different from or similar to others in the sample? What do
these differences imply about how various psychologists might
or might not communicate with each other?
With these questions as an overall guide, we can employ
more specific criteria in judging the data. The criteria de-
rive from and focus on two different aspects of the proto-
cols, the content of the constructs themselves and the qual-
ity of the constructs and the construct systems as whole
Gestalts or units. Because these two sets of criteria are
the most coherent and systematic threads we have in making
sense of the data, these criteria will be defined in detail
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before applying them to the protocols.
In understanding to what the content of the constructs
address themselves, I have derived a typology of "kinds of
constructs" which I drew from the total sample of 480 con-
structs. In looking at all the constructs, it appeared that
one could classify constructs, albeit loosely, into four
types. The four types differentiate the focus or orientation
of the constructs. The implications of having a preponder-
ance of one kind of construct as opposed to another will be
considered later. At this point, it is important to make
these differentiations clear.
The first kind of construct is that which focuses di-
rectly; on some aspect of people and behavior . Constructs
which have this type of focus take some stand on how people
function in the world or how the world affects people. These
constructs are perhaps closest to some of the philosophical
underpinnings of psychology as a discipline. Examples of
Type I constructs include: active/passive, inner-directed/
other-directed, behavior as modifiable/predetermined, dynamic/
static, internal/external control of behavior, person as con-
troller/person as victim, imply dependence/independence, in-
dividual as interactive/individual as singular. (All exam-
ples come from the protocols.) All these constructs take
some theoretical stance on how people and behavior operate.
This type of construct, with its direct focus on people,
is to be distinguished from a second kind (Type II) , those
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which focus, on how people and behavior are studied
. This
type of construct is once- removed, so to speak, from a direct
focus on people. Many of these constructs, as could be ex-
pected, deal with methodological issues and with the way peo-
ple are studied. In other words, these constructs deal with
whence the concepts came, rather than to what or to whom they
are applied. Examples of Type II constructs are: laboratory
analog/directly observable, causal model/ interactive model,
inferred/observed, empirical/ theoretical
,
measurable/not mea-
surable, knowledge-oriented/action-oriented. These types of
constructs are almost commentaries on the concepts themselves,
rather than on people and behavior. But they are a certain
kind of commentary, in that they do provide information on
the field and how it views people. - Although they are one
step removed from direct dimensions about people, they are
not so bland or devoid of content that they tell us nothing
and could just as well be dimensions of something else be-
sides psychological concepts.
Third type of construct (Type III ) , of which there were
enough in the 480 to comprise a category, are dimensions
which are only descriptive of the concepts themselves and
are, in a sense, twice-removed from teaching us psychology's
views on people. Many of these constructs are simply adjec-
tives which really could be applied to many other things. At
best, some of these constructs have evaluative components,
indicating some concern by the respondent toward some issue
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brought up by the concepts. The evaluative part of these
constructs may tell us something about how the field divides
up and looks at people and behavior. For instance, examples
from this category include: complex/mechanistic, simplistic/
complex, reductionistic/holistic, definite/indefinite, sci-
entific/mystical, concrete/abstract, molar/molecular, multi-
dimensional/unidimensional, wide applicability/narrow range,
functional/artificial. It can be seen that these constructs
are not about people or methodology but rather about concepts
themselves. Perhaps the task itself is to blame for the
large number of Type III constructs. Perhaps respondents
found it so difficult and abstract to compare the content and
vantage points of different concepts that they resorted to
describing attributes of the concepts themselves.
Finally, a fourth type of dimension (Type IV ) in the
data consists of those constructs which are nomative in na-
ture, that is, those in which names of sub-areas are substi-
tuted for the concepts themselves. For instance, if the
three concepts to be compared in a particular sort were M ego n
,
"cognitive dissonance" and "drive theory", the nomative con-
struct given might be "psychological/biological." This con-
struct tells us very little about people , behavior , or the
field, except that "psychological" and "biological" are head-
ings of sub - areas or concerns within the field . While they
may show how the field is divided up, they provide little in-
formation about how the particular psychologist views and in-
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terprets concepts in his/her work. These sorts of constructs
are merely one level more abstract or generalized than the
concepts themselves. Essentially, they are higher-order sy-
nonyms. Examples of Type IV constructs include: physiolo-
gical/social, psychological/biological, content area/view-
point, investigative tool/substantive content, p*erceptual/
emotional, physical/sociocultural
,
psychological process/
theoretical approach, cognitive/physiological. My subjective
impression in administering the Rep tests was that often when
a respondent, for whatever reason, did not identify specific
dimensions, s/he resorted to giving nomative constructs. 1
In summary, then, this part of this section has develop-
ed a set of criteria which distinguishes various kinds of
constructs from each other, based on their focus and orienta-
tion. We are still left to enumerate a second set of crite-
ria, those which deal with the quality of the construct sys-
terns, considered one at a time.
These sets of criteria are adapted directly from Kelly's
analyses of Rep tests. As outlined earlier, these criteria
focus on: the cognitive complexity of a construct system,
the presence of M constellatory ff constructs (as in stereotyp-
ing)
,
or of "preemptive" constructs (one construct rules out
the presence of certain others). Also, one can look at the
"permeability," the "dilation/ constrict ion," or the "tight-
ness/looseness" of constructs , and the "range of convenience"
of various constructs. These criteria have been explained in
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greater detail above and their application will be illus-
trated in the presentation of results.
While it is not the purpose of this study to embark on
intensive individual analyses of 32 protocols, using all of
Kelly's criteria, it does appear that many of his criteria
help to guide our understanding and comparison of some of the
construct systems. Furthermore, some of his criteria, when
applied to these Rep tests, carry implications for how psy-
chologists may communicate with each other. For instance, if
we made the judgment that most of the construct systems were
highly "impermeable," then we might conclude that psycholo-
gists have a hard time talking with one another. If we found
that the construct systems were not cognitively complex, this
might have implications for the quality of the paradigm in
which psychologists operate. However, it must be reiterated
that the application of Kelly's criteria is an educated and
yet sub j ect ive judgment, based on intensive interaction with
the data, both with individual protocols separately and with
many collectively.
To summarize the criteria on which these judgments are
based, there are four construct - types which delineate the
focus
,
orientat ion
,
or content of constructs in the sample:
1. constructs which focus directly on some view of
people and behavior; Type I; e.g., "internal/
external control of behavior."
2. constructs which focus on how people and behav-
ior are studied; Type II; e.g., "lab analog/
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directly observable."
3. constructs which are descriptive of the con-
cepts themselves; Type III; e.g., "molar/
molecular."
4. constructs which are nomative in nature; Type
IV; e.g., "biological/social."
There are seven related criteria provided by Kelly which
are useful in assessing the quality of constructs and con-
struct systems:
1. cognitive complexity
,
defined by Bieri et_ al.
(1961) as involving both "differentiation Tnum-
ber of different dimensions underlying a con-
struct system) and articulation (extent of dis-
criminations made within a dimension)" (in Wig-
gins, p. 490). Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder
(1961) note a concrete/abstract dimension as a
significant aspect of cognitive complexity.
2. the degree to which constructs are constella -
tory : the presence of one construct implies
the presence of others, as in stereotyping.
Zj the degree to which constructs are preemptive :
the presence of one construct preempts the
presence of certain others
.
4. the degree to which constructs and construct
systems are perme able or impermeable : their
flexibility in being open to new dimensions.
5. the dilation / constrict ion of construct systems
(related to permeability).
6. the tightness / looseness of construct systems
(related to 4 and 5)
.
7. the range of convenience of various constructs:
indicates Eow widely applicable a construct is
to the set of stimulus items.
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Data Explication
: Case Examples
In applying these criteria, consider the following con
struct protocols:
CASE I (faculty, clinical ) CASE II (student, clinical!
reductionis tic/ expansive
flexible/rigid
cognitive/ affective
concrete/ abstract
complex/ simplistic
predictable/unpredictable
quantitative/qualitative
structured/unstructured
theoretical/ empirical
other- oriented/ self- oriented
potentiality/ restriction
closed/ open- ended
cumulative/ integrative
rational /irrational
defined/undefined
isolated/ integrated
dynamic/static
structure and process/pure pro-
cess
cognitive/emotional
.
need for others/self
-suffici-
ency
simpl is tic/ complex
interactional/ self-perpetuating
ascribed characteristics/situa-
tional assessment
singular perspective/multiple
perspective
relational/ intellectual
change -oriented/ immutable
internally directed/externally
directed
simultaneity/ evolutional
single focus/integrated
intrapsychic/ relational
These first two cases show the raw data in the order in which
they were obtained. Each bipolar construct was generated from a
comparison of three concepts. While the concepts used in
each case were different, many of them are similar or re-
lated. Nevertheless, two very different profiles emerge.
In looking first at Case I, note that at least seven of
the fifteen constructs can be grouped together, or subsumed
under one major construct. These include: reductionis tic/
expansive, closed/open- ended , structured/unstructured, de-
fined/undefined, restriction/potentiality, and perhaps pre-
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dictable/unpredictable. All these constructs can be logic-
ally subsumed under the heading of restriction/potentiality.
Other constructs in the protocol can also be linked. For
instance, the dimensions "quantitative/qualitative" and "em-
pirical/theoretical" seemed connected. Also, one could clus-
ter "concrete/abstract" and "simplistic/complex** together.
Notice that there are three constructs which are more direct-
ly about people: rational/irrational, cognitive/affective,
and other-oriented/self-oriented. Finally, there remains the
construct "cumulative/integrative" which could be judged as
the most cognitively complex and abstract construct in the
protocol (see criteria for complexity) and also as one which
stands on its own. In applying our criteria, we might con-
clude that this is not a particularly complex protocol, main-
ly because there is one overriding constellation of con-
structs, namely the seven constructs noted above. Parts of
this person's system seem permeable in that some constructs
are not tightly connected to other constructs, while the con-
stellatory part seems rather tight and impermeable.
Case I is noteworthy in its absence of many Type I con-
structs. Rather, there is a preponderance of Type II and
Type III constructs. However, from this case one can see the
difficulty in making definitive categori zations of constructs
What is interesting in this case is that one cannot distin-
guish between constructs which describe people and those
which describe methodology. For instance, the theme of Mpo-
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tentiality/restriction" seems applied to both research and to
behavior
.
Now consider Case II. The character of this construct
system is quite different. While some of the constructs seem
related, few can be logically subsumed under others. For in-
stance, even " intrapsychic/relational" and "relational/ intel-
lectual" do not refer to the same areas of human experience.
Only "isolated/integrated," "singular perspective/multiple
perspective" and "single focus/ integrated" are similar or
convergent. Using the definitions (see criteria above) of
cognitive complexity provided by Bieri and by Harvey, Hunt,
and Schroder, this is a very complex system. Note also that
a majority of the constructs are directly about people and
behavior (Type I). This system is seen to be quite permea-
ble, quite ready to absorb and integrate new dimensions.
This judgment is made because there is only one minor con-
stellation of constructs and no constructs which might pre-
empt the presence of others.
Now consider two more construct systems.
CASE III (faculty, clinical) CASE IV (faculty, clinical)
interpretative/ stabl
e
internal/ external
externally appli ed/ internal
ly applied
controlling/uncontrolled
non-specific/ specific
verbally mediated/under no
controlling influence
global/ specific
qualitative/quantitative
uniqueness /normative
cognitive/behavioral
relationship- centered/ ob j ect-
centered
holistic/atomistic
time -oriented/pre sent -oriented
qualitative/quantitative
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systematic/variable
orderly/ sporadic
variable system/established
system
measureable/not measureable
external/internal control
interpretive/ st able
lack of control/control
occurring in interactive
fashion/occurring in iso-
lated fashion
predictive/descriptive
theory/practice
content
-oriented/structure-
oriented
present
-oriented/past- oriented
external/internal determinants
mot ivat ional/des crip tive
holistic/atomistic
change
-oriented/understanding-
oriented
In Case III, many of the constructs are related to each
other. One large constellation consists of: interpretive/
stable, variable/systematic, sporadic/orderly, non-specific/
specific, not measureable/measureable , and so on. A second
cluster (constellation)
,
perhaps really a variant of the
first cluster, consists of: uncontrolled/ controlled, lack of
control/control
, under no controlling influence/verbally me-
diated. A third closely related cluster centers around in-
ternal/external control. Only the dimension "interactive/
isolated" breaks out of the closely tied constellations. It
appears that only a few dimensions are salient for this psy-
chologist: control and order, either internal or external.
This is an excellent example of a very tight, constricted,
impermeable construct system. In this case, it appears that
these factors preempt the incorporation of other- kinds of
constructs, mainly because of the tightness of the constella-
tions. Again, one should note the lack of clarity as to whe-
ther constructs apply to people or methodology. In fact, it
would seem here that the focus is so sharp and delineated
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that constructs would apply to both areas. Hence, while it
is hard to decide if these are Type I or Type II constructs,
this lack of differentiation between constructs about people
and those about methodology may have interesting implica-
tions, paradigmatically speaking.
Case IV presents yet another interesting profile. While
this is a fairly well - integrated and organized system (pro-
bably more so than Case II), it is still quite complex, com-
pared to Cases I and III. It seems less permeable (despite
its complexity) than Case II, in that in Case IV, there al-
most seem to be boundaries around the person's thinking.
Within the system, there is far more room to entertain ideas
than in Case III, and yet it still appears more "set in its
ways" than Case II. Case IV also -illustrates a rather clear
integration of both people-oriented and method-oriented di-
mensions. In this protocol, it appears that the person has
more clearly delineated which constructs are research-based
(e.g., "qualitative/quantitative") and which are people-based
("past-oriented/present-oriented") . There are also a number
of different construct - types in this profile, rather than a
preponderance of just one type, as in Case VI. There seems
to be a grasp of both an understanding of people and of con-
cepts, and it is possible to sort out dimensions about people
from dimensions about concepts. One interesting and somewhat
idiosyncratic twist in this protocol is an emphasis on a time
dimension. When this is compared to Case I's emphasis on po-
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tentiality/restriction, one can observe just how individual-
istic the protocols are. One should also note that the Rep
test is sensitive enough as an instrument to pick up these
important differences in thought systems. Hence, Case IV il-
lustrates a cognitively complex system which is somewhat im-
permeable
.
CASE V (student, clinical )
dynamic/static
explanatory/post hoc
focus of cause/effect
focus on understanding/focus on behavior
behavior as modifiable/predetermined
internal influence/external influence
behavior as quantifiable, measureable/quali tative
explanatory/ category
non-restrictive (free) /reality constraints
individual focus/across people
interactional /intrapersonal
current focus/historical
internal motivation for behavior/external
public, observable reality/private, unobservable reality
people capable of responding to public reality/people not al-
ways capable of responding to public reality
In comparison, Case V shows a rather complex and people-
centered construct system, with a special emphasis on the ex-
tent to which "reality" constrains behavior. It should be
noted that this focus remains people- centered and not method-
ology-centered. While there are Type II and Type III con-
structs, much of the focus still remains toward people. The
focus in this case is, in a way, related to the focus in Case
I on potentiality/restriction and to the focus in Case II to
order and control, but in Case V, this theme is closely tied
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to an understanding of people. Whatever the similarities,
however, the nuances and inuendoes which differentiate con-
struct systems from each other are clearly very important.
It should become evident by this point that if more than two
systems are compared at one time, the richness of the inter-
play within a protocol is lost, particularly if the protocols
are complex.
Compare Case V to Case VI:
CASE VI (student, non-clinical )
empirical/hypothetical
reductionis tic/holistic
methodological/ theoretical
specific/ambiguous
deductive/ inductive
narrow/broad
reductionist ic/hol is tic
theoretical/methodological
holistic
,
inductive/ reductionis tic
empirical/ theoretical
reductionis tic/holistic
external/ internal
realistic/ idealistic
specific/broad
obj ective/sub j ective
Notice that in Case VI, there is hardly a construct which is
definitively about people. Almost all constructs are Type II
and III. Clearly, this person viewed the concepts either
evaluatively (Type III) or in terms of where they came from
(Type II). The difference between the thinking in Case VI
compared to Case V is so tremendous, that it would be doubt-
ful that these two people would have much in common in their
orientations as psychologists. In Case VI, it is not even
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obvious that the person is a psychologist and not a biologist.
Case VI is a fairly simple and cohesive construct system with
a few highly related constellations of constructs. For in-
stance, reductionistic/holistic is used four times, is simi-
lar to narrow/broad, and may be .related to specific/broad.
Another constellation, which seems related to the first con-
stellation, includes constructs like: empirical/hypothetic-
al, methodological/theoretical, and deductive/ inductive
.
These constellations are good examples of Type II constructs.
CASE VII (student, non-clinical )
internal process of causation/ contextual causation
finite variables/infinite number of variables
theory as approximation/ theory as explanation
person as controller/person as victim
combinatory process/singular process
holistic/linear
complex/mechanistic
intuition as part of systematic thinking/intuition not part
of systematic thinking
hereditary/con textual
behavior as predictable/unpredictable
dynamic/non- dynamic
finite causali ty/ infinite causality (anarchy)
molecular/multiple wholes
linear/nonlinear
simple/complex
Case VII is also a good example of a predominance of
Type II constructs, i.e., how people and behavior are studied.
In this case, there is a preoccupation with the approach the
researcher takes toward his/her work. In interviewing this
respondent after the task was completed, he told me that his
primary concern was the "presumptuousness" of the researcher.
55
There are comparatively few (cf., Cases V and IV) constructs
directly about people and behavior. Nevertheless, Case VII
presents a thoughtful and rich set of constructs. They are
highly abstract and show a complicated thought process which
informs this person's work. While the emphasis is once re-
moved from people, this constitutes a complex and organized
system. This person's cognitive complexity is devoted to
thinking about research rather than people. While both Case
VII and Case VI are oriented toward how people and behavior
are studied (Type II), the constructs in Case VII are them-
selves more abstract and more varied, thus making the total
construct system more cognitively complex than Case VI.
CASE VIII (faculty, non-clinical )
psychological process/ theoretical approach
methodological/ theoretical
molecular/molar
p er s on- oriented/non- person -oriented
molecular/molar
non- scientific/ scientific
non- cognitive/ cognitive
psychological/ s tat is tical
cognitive/behavioral
theoretical/ empirical
behavioral/cogni t ive
scientific/mystical
theoretical/ empirical
cognitive/physiological , behavioral
cognitive, comparative process/non- comparative
Compare Case VII to Case VIII. In Case VIII, there is a
preponderance of cons truct- types II, III, and IV. There are
a number of nomative constructs and evaluative-descriptive
constructs. Note that there are relatively few dimensions
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about people, as compared to Cases II, IV, and V. Again, the
focus here is on where the concepts originate (e.g., empiric-
al/hypothetical) rather than on what the concepts imply about
people. This is a fairly well- integrated system in that the
constructs seem related, but it is neither particularly com-
*
plex nor permeable.
Nevertheless, complexity must be judged in relation to
other protocols. Compared to Case IX, Case VIII is quite
complex.
CASE IX (faculty, clinical )
internal/ external
idiographic/normative
focus on parts/whole
focus on differences/ central tendency
behavior controlled by current environment/past events
internal/ external regulation
focus on normal/disordered behavior
idiographic/normative
internal/ external control
focus Dn disordered behavior/ordered behavior
external/ internal control
external/ internal control
purely environmental regulation/person- environment interac-
tion
behavior controlled by past events/controlled by current en-
vironment
external/ internal control
Essentially, Case IX has only three constructs: idiographic/
normative
,
internal/ external control , and normal/ disordered
.
This illustrates an unusually simple and unsophisticated sys-
tem. Notice the vast difference between the cognitive com-
plexity of the thinking in Case II compared to Case IX.
Hence, using the criteria of complexity, it is interesting to
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compare Cases II and IX. Yet, it should be noted that Case
II 's constructs are almost all Type I constructs, as compared
to Cases VI or VII. It becomes increasingly clear, as we
proceed in this explication, that it is impossible to compare
all the protocols on all criteria. Some criteria are espe-
cially prominent in certain protocols and are best illus-
trated in relation to other protocols which have different
foci and different qualities. It also becomes obvious through
this analysis that there is tremendous variation within and
between protocols.
CASE X (student, non- clinical )
individual as active/passive
theoretical /empirical
theoretical/ empirical
theoretical explanation/practical -change focus
individual/ group
broad/narrow
process -oriented/ structure -oriented
theoretical/ empirical
specific/ general
hypothetical, inferred/observed, measureable
passive/active
individual as trying to predict/ individual as trying to un-
derstand
methodological/ theoretical
particular is tic/universal is tic
Case X demonstrates a mixture of all the construct- types
,
with an emphasis on the methodological. Here again there is
some blurring between constructs about people and those about
how people are to be studied. For instance, while the con-
struct "individual as trying to predict/understand" is clear-
ly about people, it is very similar to other dimensions which
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focus on the predictive and theoretical elements in concepts.
The implications of this merging of the way one sees people
and does research will be discussed later.
Case X also shows the redundancy of many constructs. As
noted earlier, respondents were usually reluctant to repeat
themselves and hence often gave synonymous constructs. In
Case X, the total fifteen constructs can be summarized in
just a few constructs: theoretical/empirical, passive/ active
,
specific/general, etc. When constructs are repeated in this
way, one can surmise that the cognitive field of the person
is heavily influenced by the few constellations. This, in
itself, is probably preemptive and must serve to constrict
the overall thought system.
CASE XI (faculty, non- clinical )
fixed/plastic
mental., structure/personality structure
internal /external
dynamic/ static
cognitive (internal events) /behavioral (external)
internal/ external
explanatory/ descriptive
dynamic/ stat ic
external (behavioris tic) /internal (cognitive)
dynamic/ static
internal/ external
explanatory/descriptive
explanatory/ descriptive
state (factual events) /trait
explanatory (interpretive) /descriptive
Another example of a limited cognitive field (low com-
plexity) is Case XI. Here again, four or five dimensions can
subsume the rest: cognitive/behavioral, internal/external
,
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dynamic/static, explanatory/descriptive. In this case, the
person makes it clear that two salient dimensions are con-
stellatory: cognitive/behavioral and internal/external.
CASE XII (faculty, non-clinical )
multiple focus/single focus
cultural determinants/innate determinants
environmental/ intra- individual
implicit bias/empty organism
internal/external focus
global/narrow
collaborative research/subjects (Ss) as objects
dialectical/ linear
focus on parts/whole
mul tidimens ional/unidimensional
person in environments/no interaction between individual and
environment
acceptance of value and belief systems in Ss/denial of value
or belief systems in Ss
interdisciplinary/single frame
physical/ socio cultural
atomistic/holistic
Finally, Case XII, like Case VII, focuses to some extent
on Type II constructs. There is concern in this case, (cf.,
Case VII) with how subjects in experiments are treated.
There is also an emphasis on how multidimensional the re-
searcher's orientation is. Case XII is complex and rather
well- integrated, with a focus on the complexities of s tudying
people. Again, in noting the richness of individual differ-
ences, the focus in Case XII on the interdisciplinary per-
spective, as a part of being multidimensional, is completely
different from the focus on "reality constraints" in Case V.
In summary, then, it becomes clear through this presen-
tation that individual differences in one's approach to the
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task and in the construct systems generated from it, are
enormous and enlightening. These differences also make ob-
vious why the data are depleted of their depth when compiled
"across" people. Indeed, the shades of meaning in a protocol
are only meaningful within the total Gestalt of the individual
profile. Nevertheless, we are able to apply the sets of cri-
teria, in an effort to ferret out the kinds of differences
which are present. Some criteria are more pertinent in cer-
tain cases, but the criteria are generally useful in making
distinctions between protocols and will be especially helpful
in making interpretations from the data. The four construct-
types, while not always distinguishable, do help in viewing
overall areas of concern in the data.
Finally, it should be noted that these twelve profiles
were chosen for a variety of reasons. They represent a
cross- section of the kinds of data obtained. All four groups
of respondents in the sample are represented. Different le-
vels of cognitive complexity are shown, as well as different
kinds of construct- types . Some of the cases used were chosen
because they are reasonably typical (given individual differ-
ences) of parts of the total sample, and some because they
are exemplary of the various criteria.
Results: Trends and Themes
In light of the qualitative nature of the data, it would
be both reductionis tic and inaccurate to report definitive
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results. Rather, we can enunciate various trends and themes
which stand out from the protocols and the total sample.
These trends are interpretative, as opposed to definitive,
because the idiographic nature of the data necessarily leads
to the presence of exceptions to every statement made and
every trend reported.
The lack of def ini tiveness in the data became even more
evident in an attempt to investigate more quantitatively the
possibility of discernible differences between various groups
of respondents. A sorting task was arranged, in which two
people who had been in the study were asked to sort 32 cards
with the 32 construct systems into four piles- -clinical stu-
dents, clinical faculty, non-clinical students, non-clinical
faculty. Neither respondent was able to distinguish between
faculty and students. Both respondents were able to distin-
guish between clinicians and non- clinicians to some extent.
One respondent got 20 out of 32 correctly sorted (62.5%),
while the other got 22 out of 32 correct (68%) . goodness-
of-fit tests on the two sorters' preformances proved non-
significant. Statistical significance would have mandated
a performance of 24 out of 32 or 75% correct in sorting.
Despite the inability for respondents to figure out
differences between clinicians and non- clinicians , it is
possible, using the criteria set forth earlier, to see dif-
ferences between the various sub-groups. Hence, we will
first describe the trends which distinguish groups from each
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other and then move to a report of some general trends over
almost all respondents.
Between students and faculty, the following trends can
be observed. First, faculty constructs tend to contain
shorter, more terse phrases to articulate dimensions. Stu-
dents, on the contrary, often use longer phrases in their
constructs. Second, while faculty constructs tend to be less
permeable and less cognitively complex and rich than stu-
dents, they tend to be better organized than students'. Pro-
bably the brevity of the words used in dimensions is related
to this overall economy in faculty construct systems. Stu-
dent construct systems, with some exceptions, tend to be more
cognitively complex, richer, more permeable, but less well
integrated. Student construct systems are considered com-
plex given Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder's notion of a concrete/
abstract dimension in complex constructs. Perhaps this is
reflected in the longer, more wordy constructs given by stu-
dents. Bieri's criterion of differentiation (number of di-
mensions) is also evident in many student cases which are
complex. Bieri's criterion of articulation (extent of dis-
criminations made within a dimension) is less obvious in
these protocols as a determinant of complexity, although it
can be noted to some extent in cognitively complex protocols.
Finally, there is no obvious trend in the types of constructs
used which help distinguish students from faculty.
Between clinicians and non- clinicians in the sample, the
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following trends appear. In general, clinicians employ more
Type I constructs, while non- clinicians use more Type II con-
structs. The general tone of many of the construct systems
illustrates or at least suggests these differences. One can
find no highly integrated, cognitive ly complex construct sys-
terns which are Type II in focus in the clinical group. The
most complex systems among clinicians are heavily Type I in
orientation. Likewise, one is hardpressed to find highly
complex, Type I-oriented construct systems in the non-clini-
cian group. Hence, when there is complexity in a clinician's
protocol, its focus is likely to be directly related to no-
tions about people and behavior. When there is complexity in
a non-clinician's construct system, its focus is likely to be
on how people and behavior are studied. In addition, it
should be noted that there are no discernible differences be-
tween groups in the employment of Type III and Type IV con-
structs .
To some extent, it appears that the first set of cri-
teria (construct types) , which deal with the focus of the
constructs, helps delineate between clinicians and non-cli-
nicians but not students and faculty, whereas the second set
of criteria, from Kelly, which deal with the quality of con-
structs and construct systems, helps differentiate more be-
tween students and faculty. Thus, the overall trends suggest
that students show greater complexity and permeability but
less organization. Faculty, on the other hand, show tenden-
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cies toward fewer constructs which are better organized, of-
ten at the expense of both complexity and permeability.
In looking at the total sample, many of the individual
differences which enrich the data become muted. However,
there are themes in the total sample which emerge through
interaction with the data. In pointing out these themes, it
may be helpful to again rely on the construct types. Within
Type I constructs, the most salient dimension to emerge is
"internal/external control of or motivation for behavior."
This construct, or variations on it, is the commonest through-
out the sample, within this construct- type . Within Type II
constructs, the clearest theme about how people and behavior
are studied derives from dimensions like "empirical/hypothe-
tical," "inferred/observed" and so on. These dimensions are
actually correlates of the internal/external control dimen-
sion in Type I constructs, in that they tap into whether re-
search is controlled or uncontrolled, public or private, tan-
gible or intangible, or definitive or ambiguous.
Within the third construct- type (descriptive) , a few
themes can be noted. These reflect dimensions like "molar/
molecular," "global/specific," "holistic/atomistic," "reduc-
tionist ic/expans ive ," and "knowledge -oriented/ act ion- oriented"
or "theoretical/applied." The first two themes seem related
to each other, in that what is molecular might also be re-
ductionistic and what is molar might also be expansive. The
last theme noted is a major factor in distinguishing between
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clinicians and non- clinicians in general. The distinction
between concepts that advance theory and those which have a
more practical application seems important in the sample.
The fact that many concepts can be contrasted on the basis
of this distinction may suggest that there is some mutual ex-
clusivity between applied and theoretical notions in the
field. Finally, no particular themes emerge from the fourth
construct- type, i.e., nomative dimensions.
In general, though, the themes which emerge center
around the degree of control the individual has over his/her
behavior and the degree of control the researcher has over
his/her research. There seems to be some merging or fusing
of these two seemingly interrelated themes, in that it is
often hard to know if constructs refer directly to people and
behavior or to how people and behavior are to be studied.
This relationship, as well as its relationship to themes from
construct- type III, will be explored below.
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION AND INTERPRETATION
In interpreting the trends enumerated above, and in dis-
cussing the overall implications of this study, the data and
the entire research process need to be understood within a
number of frameworks. First, we need to evaluate the modifi-
cation of Kelly's Rep test employed in this research. Second,
we need to examine the fruitfulness of this methodology in
helping to elucidate psychology's paradigm. Third, we need
to interpret the trends reported, given Kuhn's notions of
paradigms. In addition, we should compare these findings to
the dimensions reported by Coan (1968). Fifth, we must inter-
pret the findings within the broader context of a Marxist
slant on the sociology of knowledge. Finally, we need to as-
sess the usefulness of this kind of highly abstract and ex-
ploratory research.
In determining the utility of the instrument employed in
this study, in helping to shed light on psychology's para-
digm, it is first important to point out that the notion of
"paradigm" is itself a highly abstract and perhaps intangible
concept. According to Kuhn (1962), one can provide words
which reflect the paradigm, but essentially, the operational
components of paradigms are to be found in the kind of equip-
ment and methodology used or through the "anomalies" which
disturb paradigms. Kuhn would probably agree that it is dif-
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ficult to ask scientists to articulate their paradigm, ex-
cept in retrospect. Of course, the methodology used here was
an attempt to go into people's thinking through a kind of
back door, so to speak, by asking for their constructs. This
was hopefully a reasonable choice of method for this problem,
m
given the abstract and the "taken- for- granted" nature of
paradigms
.
This approach to uncovering psychology's paradigm pro-
vides us with important information on very salient and un-
doubtably heated issues in the field today. What the study
lacks in def init iveness , it compensates for by being inter-
esting and provocative. Perhaps it is a necessary first step
in understanding ourselves in this field, to begin to docu-
ment the concerns which are so apparent in daily interaction
with psychologists. Hence, in elucidating critical dimen-
sions, even if these findings come from an interpretative and
not "conclusive" process, we are still in a better position
to evaluate ourselves and our work.
As an initial step in this process, we need to evaluate
the modification of Kellian theory and method employed here.
From the research process described above, we must conclude
that the Rep test is indeed an idiographic tool. The bipolar
constructs are most readily understood within their own con-
texts. Even though the same words may be used by different
people, the ways in which one construct is related to another
depends upon its position within its total Gestalt. This
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critical factor unfortunately limited some of the highly
nomothetic analyses intended in the study. It also makes
dubious that the assumption that "what a construct system is
to an individual, a paradigm is to the field" is anything
more than hypothetically plausible. Indeed, not only is the
whole not equal to the sum of its parts, but its parts cannot
be summed or multiplied or divided in any reasonable way.
Nevertheless, the individual explication and eventual inte-
grative process did provide a lot of rich information. It
should also be noted that while Kelly and his followers ne-
ver tried to consolidate constructs across people, they have
engaged in a process analogous to what was done here. In
other words, while Kellians only evaluate one Rep test at a
time, they have looked at various similarities and differ-
ences between different diagnostic groups, different age
groups, and the like. Approaching Rep tests in this way is
complicated because they are essentially individual measures,
and yet revealing because characteristics can only be seen
through this comparative process.
In further evaluating the method, it is necessary again
to comment on the abstractness of the task. The variation of
Kelly used here was so abstract that even the stimulus items
were abstractions. This meant that the constructs were ab-
stractions on abstractions, or meta- concepts . However chal-
lenging intellectually, there are drawbacks to collecting and
making sense of data of this nature. While it is unclear
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that paradigmatic notions could be investigated more simply,
the abstruse nature of this technique leaves something to be
desired. The problems in the logic of comparing concepts,
which several respondents articulately pointed out, also de-
tract from the advisability of this approach.
Kelly's method is both tempting and misleading in cer-
tain ways. The technique is so economical in the discrete
sort of data generated, that many variations of the original
Rep test present themselves as possibilities in research.
Indeed, it is inviting to consider the many kinds of con-
struct systems one could design for different purposes. The
simple elegance of substituting any set of stimulus items
and then supplying dimensions is appealing. However, it ap-
pears that people have a hard time- articulating constructs
which guide their thinking. Also, the constructs obtained
may only make sense within the very narrow set of stimulus
items. Having used this instrument, my impression is that
the Rep test looks more applicable to a variety of problems
than it really is. This instance suggests that the Rep test
loses both reliability and validity when its original purpose
is changed and when it is extended across people. Of course,
given the abstract nature of this study, it is unclear what
other method might have been used to supplement the Rep test.
In another study, it would seem advisable to use the Rep test
in conjunction with other measures.
Given both the shortcomings and richness of the method
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used here,
.let us now interpret the trends and themes report-
ed within the frameworks set forth at the outset of the pro-
ject. Within Kuhn's framework, the trends reported might
suggest that psychology is either
.
pre-paradigmatic or is in a
crisis state. This interpretation is made because of the
high number of Type II constructs. Kuhn might argue that the
preoccupation with how people and behavior are studied indi-
cates the beginning of a paradigm shift. Indeed, there is
ample evidence, beyond this study, that this may be the case.
Elms (1975) writes of a kind of identity or paradigmatic cri-
sis within social psychology. The data in this study, which
suggest that more non- clinicians (mainly social psychologists)
are preoccupied with Type II constructs, are consistent with
Elms' contention. Buss (1975) also notes that the field has
been inundated with articles devoted to the "self -reflection"
ongoing in the field today. Hence, the finding of many Type
II constructs may illustrate the beginnings of a major reor-
ganization of psychology's paradigm.
Other related trends can be explained within both Kuhn's
and Kelly's frameworks. For instance, the narrowness of peo-
ple's construct systems may be indicative of a profound frag-
mentation in the field. One Kellian researcher, Adams-Webber
(in Bannister, 1970), describes this fragmentation as entail-
ing constructs which are overdifferentiated but not inte-
grated. This was evident in several of the individual con-
struct systems and perhaps in the sample as a whole. The
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highly idiosyncratic dimensions often provided may imply a .
fragmentation within the field as well as within some indi-
viduals. Adams-Webber sees this leading to "potential chaos"
(schizophrenia, within an individual showing this on the ori-
ginal Rep test) (cf. James, 1975) or what Kuhn would call the
breakdown of a paradigm. The overall lack of cognitive com-
plexity in the protocols may indicate an almost rigid adher-
ence to a few key dimensions. Kuhn also notes that this
tends to happen once anomalies have upset a discipline. Of
course, it should be pointed out that all these speculations
may be artifactual and may simply derive from qualities of
the task itself. Nevertheless, assuming the task has some
validity, these are logical interpretations to make.
Kuhn's notions can be applied
-to other trends as well.
One important impression is that faculty constructs were
shorter, more explicit and more terse, and less permeable
than student constructs. Kuhn posits that as scientists be-
come increasingly embedded in their scientific communities
and in existing modes of thought, their vantage points and
assumptions become more inflexible. This idea was reflected
in this study. Socialization into the field seems to lead
to rigidification of dimensions in one's work and outlook.
Kuhn notes that a "scientific community consists of men
who share a paradigm" (p. 176). Maybe the individualistic
and often idiosyncratic nature of the data implies that we
are not much of a community . Indeed, the vast differences in
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modes of construing show a likely inability for many psycho-
logists to communicate effectively and constructively with
each other (cf. Cases V and III above). Kuhn goes on to say
that "a paradigm governs.
. .not a subject matter, but rather
a group of practitioners" (p. 18.0). If this be the case,
then this study addresses itself to the right population.
From the trends reported, though, it might be argued that
people have rather idiosyncratic, mini
-paradigms to govern
themselves and yet alienate them from potential colleagues.
This contention is consonant with Bannister's (1970) cri-
tique that psychology is comprised of many "psychologies"
rather than some unified system of thought.
Indeed, while it was possible to glean certain con-
struct- types from the data, there are many combinations and
permutations of how these types could be arranged. Either
there is a paradigm which individuals internalize or use dif-
ferently, or there is considerable fragmentation and discord
in the way psychologists work. This suggests the existence
of a paradigmatic crisis in the field today.
Further, the finding of both highly idiosyncratic con-
structs, juxtaposed with the finding of common themes (around
control) through many of the protocols, seems contradictory.
How can a field be simultaneously pre-paradigmatic (highly
individualized) and yet have common themes which seem para-
digmatic? It is argued here that this apparent paradox un-
ravels if we look at these findings as representing different
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levels of meaning within thought systems. The uniformity
represented in the theme of "control" is based on a more ab-
stract level of analysis and relies on the interpretive
framework of this study.
• Given this, it seems that psychology, as a discipline,
illustrates either a manifest fragmentation covering a latent
uniformity, or a manifest uniformity covering a more basic or
latent fragmentation. If it is the case that the field has
a manifest fragmentation which covers a more basic uniform-
ity, then it could be said that the field functions pluralis-
tically within a paradigm, or that the existing paradigm is
beginning to break down. On the other hand, if the situation
is actually that there exists a manifest uniformity which
covers a latent or more fundamental fragmentation, then one
might argue that psychology is perhaps "pseudoparadigmat ic"
,
rather than pre-paradigmatic or paradigmatic. This suggests
that in the absence of a set of fundamentally shared meanings,
the field constructs a set of shared conventions or "opera-
tional definitions" upon which a "reality" about people and
behavior is then constructed and developed. A community of
scientists could agree on a hypothetical set of definitions,
even if absurd, and then proceed as_ if these definitions rep-
resented both a deeper set of shared meanings as well as an
accurate reflection of "the real world." Anthropomorphically
speaking, the notion of a "pseudoparadigm" is akin to Vai-
hinger's concept of the "as if" personality (in Szasz, 1961,
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p. 245). Perhaps one could posit the analogy that what the
notion of "as if" is to the individual personality, the "pseu-
doparadigm" is to the field.
The salient dimensions found in this study also need to
be compared to the previous work in this area. The constructs
which stand out in this study are very close to those obtained
by Coan (1968) and enumerated earlier in the thesis. Indeed,
Coan's central theme of "fluidity/restriction" corresponds to
an emphasis in many of the protocols on "potentiality/restric-
tion." While all of his dicotomies emerge in this study,
there is a far greater emphasis in this work on what Coan
calls the "endogenous/exogenous" dimension. This dimension
is a key trend in this study. Nevertheless, Coan's dimen-
sions pretty well cover the common constructs in my total
sample. This corroboration of findings is encouraging and
lends credibility to the validity of this thesis, especially
in light of the qualitative orientation of this work in com-
parison to Coan's elegant statistical analysis.
However, while Coan's work addresses important dicotomies
underlying theorists, there is an absence of focus on the sub-
stantive concerns in the field. The present study has fo-
cused on content issues and has noted at least one crucial
content area in the field today. This trend concerns the fo-
cus on issues of "control" found in the Type I constructs in
the data. In explaining and interpreting this important
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theme, we now move to the Marxist slant on the sociology of
knowledge enunciated earlier.
Assuming that these trends are reliable and valid, we
need to account for the fact that psychologists have con-
structs about control at the root of their thinking. It is
almost as if the popular social learning theory notion of
"locus of control" is itself a meta-concept which comes into
play in numerous areas in psychologists' work. We noted ear-
lier that there was often a fusing or merging of Type I and
Type II constructs, that is, constructs about people and con-
structs about how people should be studied. This merging is
reflected in the presence of "locus of control" as a salient
dimension upon which concepts themselves are designed and
understood. In other words, it is .popular in the field today
to apply locus of control notions to understanding people and
behavior, as well as research. From this study, it also
seems popular today to invent and organize concepts themselves
on the basis of this control construct.
One seemingly appealing explanation of why psychologists
have constructs about control at the root of their thinking
is that issues of "free-will versus determinism" are funda-
mental philosophical issues which lie at the basis of the
field. And yet, this explanation does not take us very far,
simply because many other philosophical dimensions, also
deeply rooted in psychology, do not emerge as salient from
the data. For instance, issues of whether human beings are
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"good or evil" are also fundamental to the philosophical un-
derpinnings of psychology but do not emerge from the data.
Thus, there seems to be something current about psychology's
focus, on control. Indeed, Coan (1962) notes an historical
trend in the field over the last eighty years from a focus
on endogenous theories to exogenous theories.
Within the sociology of knowledge framework articulated
here, we need to understand the preoccupation with control as
growing out of our society, as being a kind of "sign of the
times." Within the Marxist framework developed here, we need
to understand this control focus as in some way exemplifying
the portrayal of human beings and their conditions within a
highly impersonal, technological, oppressive, capitalist so-
ciety. Indeed, given the Marxist position, we need to look
at the concepts psychologists invent as the products which
they produce and distribute to the society. The means by
which these products are produced, i.e., the laboratory and
so on, should tell us something about the view psychology has
of people. These means should also tell us something about
the culture and psychology's participation in its perpetua-
tion. Further, the merging of concepts about people and
those about how people are studied (the means by which psy-
chology produces ideas) is consonant with the fundamental
Marxist notion that the means of production determines modes
of rel ation (Fromm, 1962).
Psychology's preoccupation with issues of control, as
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seen in this study, is to be understood as a testimony to
people's actual lack of control over both the antecedents and
consequences of their behavior. Further, within this light,
the focus on control is understood as evidence of our actual
alienation. In a classic paper on the meaning of alienation,
Melvin Seeman (1959) notes that the commonest definition of
alienation is powerlessness
. Seeman defines powerlessness as
"the expectancy or probability held by the individual that
his own behavior cannot determine the occurrence of the out-
comes or reinforcements he seeks" (p. 383). Seeman goes on
to say that "the use of powerlessness as an expectancy means
that this version of alienation is very closely related to
the notion (developed by Rotter) of 'internal versus external
control of reinforcements' The congruence in these
formulations leaves the way open for the development of a
closer bond between the two languages of analysis--that of
learning theory and that of alienation" (p. 384-385) (cf.
Rotter, Seeman, $ Liverant , 1962)
.
Seeman' s point is exceedingly important in light of the
2present analysis. It is contended here that locus of con-
trol, as a concept or meta-concept , is not typically related
to notions of alienation and is not seen as arising out of an
actual state of alienation, because psychology as a discipline
is blind to this insight. Psychology is so flagrantly cut off
precisely because its products, or concepts, serve to rein-
force the dominant structure of the culture and to thus pla-
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cate and mystify people. Thus psychology becomes preoccupied
with whether the control of behavior is internal or external
in lieu of addressing the more basic and real experience of
an increasing lack of control. Furthermore, psychologists
then do experiments (the breeding place for concepts) in pre-
arranged, stultified situations which supposedly simulate a
high degree of control, but which then produce and distribute
notions to a non- laboratory world in which there is little
control
.
Within the Marxist context, control and alienation are
closely linked, experientially , and hence conceptually. Psy-
chology serves to obscure this connection. As psychologists
who function as appendages of the dominant superstructure, we
market concepts like "locus of control" (and a host of others
with control at their base) in order for people to think
themselves in control of their behavior. Behaviorists even
fragment behavior into tiny particles in order to insure
people's sense of "self-control." Indeed, why would this
field have such an obsession with control if not to create
and market concepts which facilitate a cultural construction
of behavior (a "social construction of reality") in terms of
having or not having control?
In another culture, we might find that a salient dimen-
sion might deal with the extent to which the individual is in
communion with the Almighty. And as psychologists, our task
would be to understand and develop the phenomena which help
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or hinder this communion process. Such phenomena might tap
into concepts such as "sinfulness," "possession by the de-
vil," and so on. We might construct scales to determine the
degree of possession by the devil, and we might exhort exor-
cism as a therapeutic solution. .
Yet in our culture, we devote our energies to "locus of
control" scales and focus our therapeutic talents toward giv-
ing the individual control over him/herself, either through
certain reinforcement schedules or insight ("Where id is, ego
shall be"). In any event, the field markets control concepts,
and it is argued here that this is because people really feel
very little control over their own destinies.
Berger and Luckmann point out that in the dialectical
process between the individual and. the society, social phe-
nomena are all constructions which take their place through
related processes of externalization
,
ob j ect ivation
,
and in -
ternalization . Indeed, concepts produced and marketed by
psychologists enter into and grow out of these processes. In
other words, we supply concepts which are needed by the cul-
ture. And then, to quote Berger and Luckmann, "the products
act back on the producer" (p. 61). When products are set
forth in the culture without recognition of this dialectic
,
such products become reified. According to Berger and Luck-
mann, "Reification is the apprehension of human phenomena as
if they were things" (p. 89). In other words, we forget that
we have "authorship" over our products. Indeed, "even while
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apprehending the world in reified terms, man continues to
produce it. That is, man is capable paradoxically of produc -
in& a reality that denies him" (p. 89) (underlining mine)
.
This is a major interpretation of the trends found in this
study which has crucial implications for the field as a
whole
.
As psychologists, we produce concepts about or based on
control, which paradoxically furthers our lack of control.
As psychologists, our preoccupation with what is really a
pseudo-issue obscures the underlying issue of our alienation,
that is, our ever- increasing lack of control. Hypothetical-
ly, if psychology were a revolutionary force and were posi-
tioned outside of the mainstream culture, it would be dealing
with precisely this underlying issue. But psychology is it-
self an agent which reinforces and perpetuates the status quo
in the culture. The interpretations articulated here suggest
ways in which psychology unwittingly abets in this perpetua-
tion. Hence, if the content of the field's paradigm is con-
stituted around notions of the control of behavior (or con-
trol of experiments) , then one can see the paradigm itself as
both oppressive and mystifying. As long as we invent and
market concepts about control, when the real issue is aliena-
tion, we continue in our collusion with other appendages of
the dominant culture.
We continue to sell a false bill of goods to the public
through our focus on concepts which supposedly give people a
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sense of control, rather than those which might address peo-
ple's sense of alienation and its sources in society, rather
than in ourselves. In actuality, people are increasingly
cut off from the antecedents of or motivations for their be-
havior. Rather than acknowledge this, psychology exacerbates
this problem in its increasing denial of private, intangible
modes of experience which may have a lot to do with the de-
termination of behavior. That which is public and which can
be more readily controlled becomes the focus of interest to
psychologists. These foci are then marketed as authorita-
tively- arrived- at concepts, which in turn become reified as
real things which constitute experience. As people interna-
lize these reified concepts, which are themselves mystifying,
they further their own alienation and mystification.
Clearly, this study does not "prove" the interpretations
offered here in any conventional way. Nevertheless, the
study does show trends which lend themselves to this type of
analysis. If we can accept the interpretations given here,
then we have accomplished one of the purposes of the study,
namely, to show how psychology serves to reinforce and per-
petuate the status quo . We have suggested that an overriding
conceptual concern within the field centers around the con-
trol of behavior, We have tied this concern to the actual
sense of alienation or lack of control in human experience in
this society. Finally, we have developed the position that
psychology participates in a dialectical process which ob-
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scures this, actual core of experience.
As a final statement, it is perhaps appropriate to as-
sess the overall usefulness of this kind of highly abstract
and exploratory research. Despite a number of problems in
administering the Rep tests, in systematically evaluating
them, and in eliciting a formal paradigm, it is "nevertheless
contended here that this has been a valuable process to un-
dertake. Because there are an ever increasing set of doubts
in the field about how psychologists should operate, it is
very important for research of this type to be done. Con-
sonant with this view, Buss (1975) advocates that a sub-area
within psychology, called the "sociology of psychological
knowledge", be established to legitimize exactly this sort of
self-exploration. Little (1972) advocates self
- ref lexivity
in models of research to increase the congruence between how
psychologists see themselves compared to how they see others.
Sanford (1970) also advises that careful self-survey is need-
ed in the social sciences in order to gain some independence
from the larger political system.
This type of exploratory research is also important as
a way of learning to create, develop, and explicate methodo-
logies . This is vital if psychology as a discipline is to
not become further alienated, itself, from the means by which
it produces ideas , or products . Indeed , our tacit acceptance
of various statistical operations serves, within our own do-
main, to reify what are basically other social constructions-
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Therefore, research which views method (means) as being at
least as important as findings (ends), is exemplary of a less
alienated and potentially more humane approach to knowledge
itself. Hopefully, this research has been an effort in that
direction.
84
FOOTNOTES
1To make an analogy (which will either further confuse
or potentially clarify), let me use Rorschach terminology.
The difference between Type I constructs (directly about peo-
ple) and constructs which are nomative (Type IV)", is similar
to the difference in Rorschach determinants between M re-
sponses and F responses
. M responses, like Type I constructs,
show a taking-in of the stimuli, an integration of the stimu-
li with "inner life," either emotional or intellectual, and
an ability to articulate these inner workings. Plain or pop-
ular F responses, like Type IV constructs, illustrate a lack
of inner working. Rather, both are fast, standard responses
which show either a lack of depth or a high degree of social-
ization or perhaps a high degree of defensiveness
.
Continuing with this comparison of construct- types to
Rorschach determinants, perhaps we can understand the other
two construct- types in this way. Type II constructs, those
which focus on how people and behavior are studied, contain
inner working with the stimuli but are intellectualized and
distant, much like a Vista responses on the Rorschach might
«
be. The third type of construct, those which describe qual-
ities or properties of the concepts themselves, without deal-
ing with the implication or meanings of the concepts, are
perhaps roughly analogous to Dd responses - -accurate and cor-
rect but rather uninformative or devoid of real substance.
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While these types of constructs, or these types of Rorschach
responses, show some indication of the person's dealing with
the stimuli, there is still less meaningful production than
in an integrated M response.
Perhaps I am drawn to this Rorschach analogy because in
both the Rorschach and in this variation of the Rep test, the
interpretator needs to employ some system which differenti-
ates and organizes ways that different people approach and
relate to sets of unusual stimuli.
2Seeman's definition of alienation is not offered as an
accurate or exhaustive definition of alienation. A compre-
hensive exploration of notions of alienation are beyond the
scope of the thesis. However, Seeman's view is presented be-
cause of its relevance to issues of control which are preva-
lent in the field of psychology today.
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APPENDIX.
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>
List of Concepts
1. a concept that is useful to you in research you are do-
ing or would like to do:
2. a concept that is central to the class you liked best in
graduate school:
3. a concept that is central to a course you would like to
teach:
4. a concept that is central to the course you liked least
in graduate school:
5. a concept that is currently popular (widely used) but
which is incompatible with your orientation:
6. a concept that is currently popular (widely used) but not
relevant or important to your work:
7. a concept you feel will become increasingly important and.
will influence the future direction of the field:
8. a concept you think is somewhat of a "fad" but which has
no real lasting value:
9. a concept that used to be highly regarded years ago but
which is not given much credence now:
10. a concept you feel has influenced the direction of the
f ield
:
11. a molar concept (theory) that you think best explains
and understands people and their behavior:
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a molar concept (theory) that you think inadequately ex-
plains people and their behavior:
a concept you feel has practical or applied value in
creating change in people or systems:
a concept that describes your methodological orientations:
a concept that has influenced you personally:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
95
List of Sorts
I. 6. currently popular but irrelevant to your work
7. will influence direction of the field
9. used to be popular but not given credence now
II. 1. useful in your research
4. worst course in graduate school
15. influenced your personally
III. 3. central to course you would like to teach
13. has practical or applied va ue in creating change
in people/systems
14. describes your methodological orientation
IV. 4. worst course in graduate school
8. "fad" but of no lasting value
10. has influenced the direction of the field
V. 7. will become important and influence field
8. "fad" but of no lasting value
10. has influenced the direction of the field
VI. 1. useful in research you do
6. currently popular but not relevant to your work
12. molar concept which best explains people
VII. 3. central to a course you want to teach
10. concept to worst course you had in graduate school
11. molar concept which best explains people
VIII. 2. central to best course you had in graduate school
4. central to worst course you had in graduate school
14. concept that describes your method logical orien-
tation
IX. 8. "fad" but of no lasting value
9. used to be highly regarded but not given much cre-
dence now
14. describes your methodological orientation
X. 2. central to best course in graduate school
11. molar concept that best explains people
15. concept that has influenced you personally
XI. 1. useful in your research
5. currently popular but incompatible with your orien
tation
14. describes your methodological orientation
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• used to be highly regarded but not given much cre-dence now
molar concept that best explains people
molar concept that inadequately explains people
will influence direction of the field
has practical or applied value in creating change
in people/systems
concept that has influenced you personally
central to a course you want to teach
currently popular but incompatible with your orien
tation
currently popular but not relevant to your work
central to best course in graduate school
currently popular but incompatible with your orien
tation
has influenced direction of the field
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SORTS
NO.
I.
II.
III.
IV.
SORTS CONCEPTS CONSTRUCTS
6,7,9
1,4,15
3,13,14
4,8,12
V. 7,8,10
VI. 1,6,12
VII. 3,10,11
VIII. 2,4,14
IX. 8,9,14
X. 2,11,15
XI. 1,5,14
XII. 9,11,12
XIII. 7,13,15
XIV. 3,5,6
XV. 2,5,10
SIMILAR DIFFERENT EMERGENT SUBMERGED


